Veidlapa Nr. M-3 (8)

Course Description Status: Approved

Course Description Version: 24/25.P.1.00

Description Period: 2024./25 academic year pavasara semestris

Study Course Accepted: -

Study Course Description

The Russia-China Partnership - Factors and Interests

Main Study Course Information

Course Code
SZF_063
Branch of Science
Political science
ECTS
6.00
Target Audience
Political Science
LQF
Level 7
Study Type And Form
Full-Time; Part-Time

Study Course Implementer

Course Supervisor
Una Aleksandra Bērziņa-Čerenkova
Structure Unit Manager
Karina Palkova
Structural Unit
Faculty of Social Sciences
Contacts

Dzirciema street 16, Rīga, szf@rsu.lv

About Study Course

Objective

To provide knowledge on the main aspects of the Russia-China partnership; to contribute to the development of students’ analytical skills by offering tools for the analysis of great power relations in Eurasia.

Preliminary Knowledge

General knowledge of theories and methods of International Relations, as well as basic knowledge of Russia and China.

Learning Outcomes

Knowledge

1.Using the in-depth knowledge gained in the study course of the dynamics of Russian-Chinese cooperation in historical and contemporary contexts, students will illustrate the impact of various domestic and foreign policy factors on Russian-Chinese cooperation. Based on a literature analysis on historical and current relations between the two countries, students will describe Russia’s military and political power, as well as China’s economic power and increasingly important economic and political power. Students will explain not only how these countries interact, but also the impact of the interaction on other regions, in particular Central Asia.

Skills

1.Students will choose academic literature on Russia-China cooperation in historical and contemporary context that corresponds to the topic of their paper. Students will critically evaluate ideas expressed in the scientific literature and discuss the interpretation of these ideas in peer presentations. In their independent work, students will provide an overview of the prospects and challenges for the development of the Russia-China partnership and critically analyse the problematic situations in this relationship.

Competences

1.Students will critically and comprehensively evaluate and explain in a reasoned manner the impact of various factors on the Russia-China partnership and the development of the two regions affected by the interaction. Students will generate recommendations and new ideas on scenarios for the development of Russian-Chinese cooperation in professional, academic and business environments. These competences will also be applicable to the analysis of other issues, in particular the interaction between two centres of power that are partly equivalent but at the same time different. By contrasting the experiences of different countries and the models chosen, students will demonstrate their understanding of methods of comparative politics in practice.

Assessment

Individual work

Title
% from total grade
Grade
1.
Individual work
-
-
Within the module, students will prepare for seminars, read recommended readings, write a report and prepare a presentation. The objective of the seminars is to develop students’ ability to justify their point of view; to stimulate activity; to test their knowledge of the topic and the material. The objective of the report is to develop the ability to identify the main problem of the topic; to identify and evaluate alternative arguments and points of view; to present one’s own point of view, explaining and arguing why this point of view is more acceptable and superior to any other. The report must compare all possible alternatives, considering all their weaknesses and strengths. Another objective is to develop the skills to independently research situations and problems, evaluate them and develop solutions. To assess the overall quality of the study course, the student must complete the course evaluation questionnaire on the Student Portal.

Examination

Title
% from total grade
Grade
1.
Examination
-
-
The student is required to present and submit a paper according to the topics listed below (2 to 3 presenters per topic, depending on the size of the group). Presentations of draft reports will take place in the class section of the course, drafts must be supplemented according to what was discussed during class and the revised version submitted for assessment. Technical requirements for the paper: 3 pages with line spacing 1, Times New Roman 12 or equivalent. References in footnotes, layout according to the Chicago Manual of Style.
2.
Examination
-
-
Attendance – 10%; Activity and preparedness during classes – 30%; Presentation and report – 40%; Final examination (essay) – 20%.

Study Course Theme Plan

FULL-TIME
Part 1

  1. Status of Relations: Official Russian-Chinese Narratives

Annotation: In order to build a picture of Chinese-Russian relations, it is important to explore the interests, perceptions and mutual narratives of both actors. The lecture offers an insight into how Moscow and Beijing present their relations to domestic audiences and the international community. What stories are presented to justify and support the partnership? There are similarities in the narratives, but they also contain different emphases and mysterious inconsistencies – even the official name of the partnership was presented differently in the two languages (to the Chinese public as ‘comprehensive strategic coordination partnership’ [全面战略协作伙伴关系] and to the Russian public as ‘comprehensive equal trust-based partnership and strategic interaction’ [всеобъемлющее равноправное доверительное партнерство и стратегическое взаимодействие]) before the 2019 upgrade of the status of relations. The official communication and state media provide a good insight into mutual perceptions and expectations, while also revealing sensitive topics such as the Russian people’s fear of over-reliance on raw material exports – a risk so significant that it is even included in the National Security Strategy. To convince the Russian public otherwise, both sides make extensive mention of cooperation in high-tech and high-value-added industries. Literature: - "A new era for China-Russia relationship in 2019," ChinaDaily, source: Xinhua, December 28, 2019, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201912/28/WS5e06c51ea310cf3e3558138b.html - "Beginning of Russian-Chinese talks in restricted format," President of Russia, June 5, 2019, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/60670 - Bērziņa-Čerenkova, U.A. "The People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation as Strategic Allies: Narrative analysis of public statements by Russian and Chinese officials." Riga: NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, 2020, https://www.stratcomcoe.org/peoples-republic-china-and-russian-federation-strategic-allies
EventType
Modality
Location
Contact hours
1.
Lecture
On site
Auditorium
2

  1. Russia's Approach to the Belt and Road Initiative

Annotation: Western governments and analysts see the Belt and Road Initiative as ‘a worrying continuation of China's rising power’, and rightly so, as the initiative has not only an economic but also a political logic. China, no longer the ‘shy giant’, wants to build dependencies across Eurasia. The lecture introduces Russia’s controversial attitude towards the BRI. Russian officials never deny their support for the initiative and seem to be actively involved. However, Russia has its own Eurasian ambitions, which V. Putin does not hesitate to express at BRI events. We are talking about the Eurasian Economic Union, a club of countries with some common Soviet history, which was founded in 2014, two years after the BRI’s inception. Russia also tends to refer to India in the context of the EEU, showing that it has been able to secure India’s support, unlike the BRI. By mentioning an alternative vision of Eurasia, the Russian President is signalling to the domestic audience that the country is not dependent on China. Putin’s statements show Russia’s position – it is too big to submit to multilateralism led by China, so it will participate only on its own terms. Literature: Feng, Yujun, Gabuev, Alexander, Haenle, Paul, Ma, Bin, Trenin, Dmitri, "The Belt and Road Initiative: Views from Washington, Moscow, and Beijing," Carnegie Tsinghua, 2019, https://carnegietsinghua.org/2019/04/08/belt-and-road-initiative-views-from-washington-moscow-and-beijing-pub-78774 Makarov, Igor, Sokolova, Anna, "Coordination of the Eurasian Economic Union and the Silk Road Economic Belt: Opportunities for Russia," INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS RESEARCH JOURNAL. Vol. 11. No 2 (2016), https://iorj.hse.ru/data/2016/12/08/1111884690/I.%20Makarov,%20A.%20Sokolova.pdf, p.29.
EventType
Modality
Location
Contact hours
1.
Lecture
On site
Auditorium
2

  1. Are There Really ‘No Alliances’? The Reality of Security Cooperation

Annotation: Russia’s National Security Strategy highlights China as ‘a key factor in maintaining global and regional stability’. However, China does not respond with the same – Chinese officials constantly remind their Russian counterparts of their principles of security cooperation, or the three no’s: no alliances, no confrontation, and no targeting of a third country. In practice, however, the two countries have held joint military training on land and at sea, are discussing cooperation on deep space exploration, have prioritised joint cross-border counter-terrorism and counter-extremism measures, and Russia is helping China to develop a missile attack warning system (SPRN). V. Putin and his press secretary D. Peskov refer to China and Russia as allies. The two countries are working under a mutually signed Military Cooperation Plan 2017-2020. Their security and defence relationship has expanded to include all but one of the characteristics of an alliance – a mutual defence commitment. However, international analysts point to the conclusion that Moscow insists on a common security agenda because it needs to demonstrate a strong partnership externally, while Beijing is careful – China’s participation is not comparable to Russia’s and is rather symbolic. Chinese analysts consider Russia untrustworthy because it has also signed a Military Cooperation Plan with India. Voices in Russia also point to China’s joint counter-terrorism training with Central Asian countries. The objective of the lecture is to explore the field of China-Russia security cooperation, identify areas of interest and assess the degree of involvement of both actors. Literature: Gorenburg, Dmitry, "An Emerging Strategic Partnership: Trends in Russia-China Military Cooperation," George C. Marshall Center for European Security Studies, 2020, https://www.marshallcenter.org/en/publications/security-insights/emerging-strategic-partnership-trends-russia-china-military-cooperation-0 "Russia–China Military-Technical and Military Cooperation," In: Russian–Chinese Dialogue: The 2019 Model: Report No. 46/2019, (ed. I. Ivanov,) Russian International Affairs Council, https://russiancouncil.ru/papers/Russia-China-Report46-En.pdf, p. 39-43
EventType
Modality
Location
Contact hours
1.
Lecture
On site
Auditorium
2

  1. Thinking ‘Close to the Arctic’: China’s Ambitions, Russia’s Reactions

Annotation: China has declared itself a ‘near-Arctic state’, defined as ‘one of the continental states closest to the Arctic Circle’ and therefore entitled to express opinion on the strategic, economic, scientific, environmental, logistical and resource value of the Arctic. Russia’s Arctic territory of 3.7 million square kilometres can provide China with access to all these aspects, especially as the development of the transit potential of the Northern Sea Route is included in Russia’s foreign policy concept. The Arctic seems to be a topic of mutual understanding at summits attended by Chinese and Russian leaders, as joint statements always promise cooperation in research, transport, energy, tourism and the environment. Russia, however, is reluctant to engage fully: it does not want to re-evaluate Arctic access, is suspicious of Iceland’s promises to China, and believes that such changes ultimately benefit the US: “China is pushing the idea of ‘internationalisation of the Arctic’ through Iceland, and the US is to some extent supporting this idea.” Russian experts stress the vulnerability of the Arctic if Chinese investment does not contribute to the social development of the region. China, on the other hand, considers Russia’s policy too restrictive and non-inclusive towards foreign commercial shipping companies. The lecture examines the expectations of both sides and the results of the Russia-China Arctic dialogue, and analyses China’s approach to the other Arctic Council members – Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and the USA, bearing in mind also the cooperation with Russia of the interested newcomer who wants to get involved in the Arctic – India. Literature: Guangmiao Xu, " China's Arctic Interests and Policy: History, Legal Ground and Implementation," Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 2016, vol. 60, No 2, pp. 52-62, https://www.imemo.ru/en/jour/meimo/index.php?page_id=685&id=7212&jid=7204&jj=49 Trenin, Dmitri, "Russia and China in the Arctic: Cooperation, Competition, and Consequences," Carnegie Moscow Center, 2020, https://carnegie.ru/commentary/81407
EventType
Modality
Location
Contact hours
1.
Lecture
On site
Auditorium
2

  1. China in Russia’s Neighbourhood: The Central Asian ‘Tug of War’

Annotation: Both China and Russia stress the importance of Central Asia – a region consisting of 5 countries that became independent after the collapse of the USSR – Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan – in their planning documents. Russia’s presence in the region is historically strong. Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, and Turkmenistan is an associate member. China’s interest in the region is practical, rooted in security and natural resources. Discursively and politically, Central Asia forms the core of the Silk Road Economic Belt. However, both powers face challenges in the region: the Russian language has lost its privileged status and Russia, instead of trying to maintain its attractiveness, has communicated offensively – for example, V. Putin proposed that Central Asian countries adopt the Russian education system to ensure ‘good behaviour’ of migrant workers in Russia. China, on the other hand, has turned from a growth opportunity to a cause for caution. China’s covert military base in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan’s huge debt to China, anti-Beijing rallies in Kazakhstan and public resentment over China’s treatment of Muslim minorities undermine China’s soft power in Central Asia. The lecture examines the dynamics and challenges of Chinese and Russian Central Asian policies and identifies their convergences and divergences, concluding that from a Central Asian and Western perspective, Chinese-Russian competition is a positive factor, as it provides protection against the division of the region into spheres of influence. Literature: Lynch, Ian, "What Are the Implications of China’s Growing Security Role in Central Asia?" The Diplomat, June 3, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/06/what-are-the-implications-of-chinas-growing-security-role-in-central-asia/ Umarov, Temur, " China Looms Large in Central Asia," Carnegie Moscow Center, March 30, 2020, https://carnegie.ru/commentary/81402
EventType
Modality
Location
Contact hours
1.
Lecture
On site
Auditorium
2

  1. Russia in China’s Neighbourhood: Vietnam Case Study

Annotation: Vietnam’s foreign policy towards Russia, its ‘useful but non-invasive partner’, is perceived in Moscow as a balancing of power against China, and Russia is keen to engage in this regional interplay. Russia has given the green light to cooperation projects with Vietnam despite China’s displeasure, showing that in contrast to the rhetorical Chinese-Russian friendship, expediency trumps loyalty – as illustrated by the 2018 Rosneft Vietnam BV drilling beyond the Chinese-declared nine-dash line in the South China Sea. The growing cooperation between Russia and Vietnam provides an insight into Putin’s realpolitik and can to some extent be interpreted as Russia’s symmetrical response to China’s actions in Central Asia. This argument became more relevant after Vietnam’s decision to strengthen defence ties with Russia, announced in early 2020. However, US military analysts invite not to exaggerate Russia’s role in Vietnam’s foreign policy, saying that there is no other player than the US that could deter China. The lecture offers an insight into Vietnam’s attempts to balance China by engaging Russia. It analyses the role of the US in energy dynamics and examines the potential clash of interests in Southeast Asia, a region that China seeks to keep within its sphere of influence. Literature: Huong Le Thu, Sunny Cao, "Russia’s Growing Interests in the South China Sea," Real Clear Defense, December 18, 2019, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2019/12/18/russias_growing_interests_in_the_south_china_sea_114932.html Insinna, Valerie, "US looks to increase weapons exports to Vietnam, decrease Russian influence," Defence News, February 7, 2018, https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/singapore-airshow/2018/02/07/us-looks-to-increase-weapons-exports-to-vietnam-decrease-russian-influence/ Phuc Thi Tran; Alena Vysotskaya G. Vieira; Laura C. Ferreira-Pereira, "Vietnam's strategic hedging vis-à-vis China: the roles of the European Union and Russia," Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, vol.56 no.1 Brasília 2013, https://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0034-73292013000100009
EventType
Modality
Location
Contact hours
1.
Lecture
On site
Auditorium
2

  1. Eurasia Goes Beyond Russia and China: The India Factor

Annotation: India is high on Russia’s foreign policy agenda. The ‘special and privileged strategic partnership’ is a means for Russia to balance the disproportions in the Chinese-Russian relationship. Moreover, Russia seems to be pinning its hopes on the economic development of under-populated regions through Indian investment, even including the sensitive topic of ‘temporary deployment of skilled labour from India to Russian Far East’ in the 2019 joint statement by V. Putin and N. Modi. China understands that the geopolitical realities of Eurasia call for dialogue with India, engages in formal and informal talks with the N. Modi government and is careful not to over-escalate relations. However, Russia’s friendliness towards India, plans to start joint production of military equipment and Russia’s support for India’s Arctic interests are perceived with unease in Beijing, especially in view of the 2020 Galwan Valley clash. Closer India-Russia ties deprive China of its exclusivity, it loses the possibility of being the only economic alternative to the West in Russia’s eyes. The lecture examines India’s role in Chinese-Russian relations, analyses India’s continued presence on the Chinese-Russian agenda, and contextualises the multilateral interactions of the three Eurasian great powers, including the SCO and BRICS. Literature: “Joint statement following the 20th India-Russia annual summit ”Reaching new heights of cooperation through trust and partnership“,” President of Russia, September 4, 2019, http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/5438 Guha, Seema, " Why Russia Remains India's Trusted Ally Despite Moscow's Bonhomie With China," Outlook India, July 13, 2020, https://www.outlookindia.com/magazine/story/world-news-why-russia-remains-indias-trusted-ally-despite-moscows-bonhomie-with-china/303412
EventType
Modality
Location
Contact hours
1.
Lecture
On site
Auditorium
2

  1. North Korea: The Complicated Common Neighbour

Annotation: There are many similarities between Russia’s and China’s attitudes towards the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea – both countries employ North Korean workers, both have issued loans to North Korea and allowed them to go unpaid, and both have opposed the tightening of sanctions against Pyongyang. Both countries are in favour of a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, but are categorically opposed to achieving this goal through the military destruction of North Korea’s existing political system. However, there are also differences: Russia is seen as ‘following Beijing’s lead on the Korean Peninsula’, it does not pursue an active and leading policy, it does not want to become a DPRK donor and its economic cooperation with the DPRK is stagnating. Paradoxically, it is this disinterest in the region that makes Russia a less problematic partner for South Korea than China. From South Korea’s point of view, China is too close to be trusted. Moreover, given the difficult relations between China and the US, cooperation with Beijing could expose South Korea to US criticism. The objective of the lecture is to present the historical background of the Korean Peninsula after World War II, to map the complex power dynamics surrounding the dialogue with North Korea, and to examine the disadvantages and advantages of both Russia and China engaging on the North Korean nuclear issue. Literature: Masterson, Julia, " North Korea, China, Russia Converge Positions," Arms Control Association, January/February 2020, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2020-01/news/north-korea-china-russia-converge-positions Rozman, Glibert, "THE CHINA-RUSSIA-NORTH KOREA TRIANGLE AFTER KIM JONG-UN’S TURN TO DIPLOMACY," Korea Economic Institute of America, 2019, http://keia.org/sites/default/files/publications/kei_jointus-korea_2019_1.0.pdf
EventType
Modality
Location
Contact hours
1.
Lecture
On site
Auditorium
2

  1. US Influence on Russian-Chinese Relations

Annotation: US dominance not only globally but also regionally in East Asia is a reality that both Russia and China have had to accept. However, a new regional reality is now emerging. Firstly, under the Trump administration, the US has withdrawn from a number of security and supranational governance platforms and, as a result, the two Eurasian great powers have started to explore the possibilities of reorganisation. Secondly, given the US-China disagreements, Russia has the potential to balance the two countries to its advantage – although the US mainstream media and commentators do not think it is a good idea to use Russian support to target China, this plan is nevertheless being discussed in the White House. China increasingly sees Russia as an unproblematic market for its companies that have been declared undesirable in other countries due to the US pressure, such as Huawei, Hikvision and Alibaba. The lecture explores US influence on Chinese-Russian relations, providing historical and political insights and modelling perspectives for US engagement. Literature: Kroenig, Matthew, "The United States Should Not Align With Russia Against China," Foreign Policy, May 13, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/13/united-states-should-not-align-russia-against-china-geopolitical-rivalry-authoritarian-partnership/ Zheng, Yu, "A Look at the China-US-Russia Triangle", China US Focus, March 4, 2020, https://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/a-look-at-the-china-us-russia-triangle
EventType
Modality
Location
Contact hours
1.
Lecture
On site
Auditorium
2

  1. Current Developments in Russian-Chinese Relations [Topic in 2021 – In Sickness and in Health: The Impact of COVID-19]

Annotation: Both Russia and China used COVID-19 as an impetus to gain soft power through humanitarian and medical aid campaigns, but the COVID-19 outbreak also revealed stark differences in the effectiveness of internal measures and aroused mutual suspicion. Rhetorically, Russia expressed its full support for China, opposing US criticism of the delayed response and calling blaming China counterproductive. Both governments have tried to outdo each other in the exchange of humanitarian aid and have stressed the importance of goodwill and friendship to their domestic audiences. In practice, however, Russia has expressed its dissatisfaction with China’s initial silence behind closed doors. Russian Foreign Minister S. Lavrov was not among the high-level officials attending the Belt and Road COVID-19 conference in June 2020, limiting himself to a written statement of support. Russia’s extraordinary measures, such as travel bans on Chinese citizens and sinophobic treatment of Chinese nationals, showed the true attitude towards China at both government and societal levels, and this did not go unnoticed in China. The pandemic has put the trust between the two countries to the test, but it is premature to conclude that COVID-19 will have a negative impact on Chinese-Russian relations, as V. Putin needs China’s example to exploit Russian public sentiment for his own ends. As Russians complain about the ineffectiveness and unreliability of the government response compared to the centralised measures introduced in China, V. Putin has the opportunity to introduce more vertical control. The lecture uses the impact of the pandemic as a practical example for the development of Chinese-Russian relations, evaluating the domestic and international processes triggered by COVID-19. Literature: "US lacks responsibility of a superpower in face of pandemic," Global Times, March 16, 2020, https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1182758.shtml Shah, Ankur, "Russia Loosens Its Belt," Foreign Policy, July 16, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/16/russia-china-belt-and-road-initiative/
EventType
Modality
Location
Contact hours
1.
Lecture
On site
Auditorium
2

  1. Tutorial on the Report

EventType
Modality
Location
Contact hours
1.
Class/Seminar
On site
Auditorium
2

  1. Cooperation Narratives. Literature Discussion. Presentations of Reports.

Annotation: Students and the lecturer will discuss the required readings, followed by the presentation of student reports (please see the list of topics below, under “Examinations” – Report Topics).
EventType
Modality
Location
Contact hours
1.
Class/Seminar
On site
Auditorium
2

  1. Russia’s Approach to the Belt and Road Initiative. Literature Discussion. Presentations of Reports.

Annotation: Students and the lecturer will discuss the required readings, followed by the presentation of student reports (please see the list of topics below, under “Examinations” – Report Topics).
EventType
Modality
Location
Contact hours
1.
Class/Seminar
On site
Auditorium
2

  1. China’s Interests in the Russian Arctic and Beyond: China in the Arctic Council and the Arctic Circle. Literature Discussion. Presentations of Reports.

Annotation: Students and the lecturer will discuss the required readings, followed by the presentation of student reports (please see the list of topics below, under “Examinations” – Report Topics).
EventType
Modality
Location
Contact hours
1.
Class/Seminar
On site
Auditorium
2

  1. Russia and China as Security Partners: Opportunities and Limitations. Literature Discussion. Presentations of Reports.

Annotation: Students and the lecturer will discuss the required readings, followed by the presentation of student reports (please see the list of topics below, under “Examinations” – Report Topics).
EventType
Modality
Location
Contact hours
1.
Class/Seminar
On site
Auditorium
2

  1. China’s Presence in Central Asia and Russia’s Reactions. Literature Discussion. Presentations of Reports.

Annotation: Students and the lecturer will discuss the required readings, followed by the presentation of student reports (please see the list of topics below, under “Examinations” – Report Topics).
EventType
Modality
Location
Contact hours
1.
Class/Seminar
On site
Auditorium
2

  1. Tutorial on the Methodology of Written Works

EventType
Modality
Location
Contact hours
1.
Class/Seminar
On site
Other
2

  1. Russia’s Ties With Southeast Asia – Is It Just Imagination? Case Analysis. Literature Discussion. Presentations of Reports.

Annotation: Students and the lecturer will discuss the required readings, followed by the presentation of student reports (please see the list of topics below, under “Examinations” – Report Topics).
EventType
Modality
Location
Contact hours
1.
Class/Seminar
On site
Auditorium
2

  1. Russia’s Other Partner in Eurasia – India. RIC, BRICS and SCO. Literature Discussion. Presentations of Reports.

Annotation: Students and the lecturer will discuss the required readings, followed by the presentation of student reports (please see the list of topics below, under “Examinations” – Report Topics).
EventType
Modality
Location
Contact hours
1.
Class/Seminar
On site
Auditorium
2

  1. DPRK and Russian-Chinese Cooperation – Elements of Russian and Chinese Policies in Relation to North Korea. Literature Discussion. Presentations of Reports.

Annotation: Students and the lecturer will discuss the required readings, followed by the presentation of student reports (please see the list of topics below, under “Examinations” – Report Topics).
EventType
Modality
Location
Contact hours
1.
Class/Seminar
On site
Auditorium
2

  1. US – A Key Factor in Russia-China Rapprochement? Literature Discussion. Presentations of Reports.

Annotation: Students and the lecturer will discuss the required readings, followed by the presentation of student reports (please see the list of topics below, under “Examinations” – Report Topics).
EventType
Modality
Location
Contact hours
1.
Class/Seminar
On site
Auditorium
2

  1. Current Issues in Russia-China Relations. Literature Discussion. Presentations of Reports. Conclusion of the Course

Annotation: Students and the lecturer will discuss the required readings, followed by the presentation of student reports (please see the list of topics below, under “Examinations” – Report Topics).
EventType
Modality
Location
Contact hours
1.
Class/Seminar
On site
Auditorium
2

  1. Exam

EventType
Modality
Location
Contact hours
1.
Class/Seminar
On site
Auditorium
2
Total ECTS (Creditpoints):
6.00
Contact hours:
46 Academic Hours
Final Examination:
Exam (Written)
PART-TIME
Part 1

  1. Status of Relations: Official Russian-Chinese Narratives

Annotation: In order to build a picture of Chinese-Russian relations, it is important to explore the interests, perceptions and mutual narratives of both actors. The lecture offers an insight into how Moscow and Beijing present their relations to domestic audiences and the international community. What stories are presented to justify and support the partnership? There are similarities in the narratives, but they also contain different emphases and mysterious inconsistencies – even the official name of the partnership was presented differently in the two languages (to the Chinese public as ‘comprehensive strategic coordination partnership’ [全面战略协作伙伴关系] and to the Russian public as ‘comprehensive equal trust-based partnership and strategic interaction’ [всеобъемлющее равноправное доверительное партнерство и стратегическое взаимодействие]) before the 2019 upgrade of the status of relations. The official communication and state media provide a good insight into mutual perceptions and expectations, while also revealing sensitive topics such as the Russian people’s fear of over-reliance on raw material exports – a risk so significant that it is even included in the National Security Strategy. To convince the Russian public otherwise, both sides make extensive mention of cooperation in high-tech and high-value-added industries. Literature: - "A new era for China-Russia relationship in 2019," ChinaDaily, source: Xinhua, December 28, 2019, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201912/28/WS5e06c51ea310cf3e3558138b.html - "Beginning of Russian-Chinese talks in restricted format," President of Russia, June 5, 2019, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/60670 - Bērziņa-Čerenkova, U.A. "The People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation as Strategic Allies: Narrative analysis of public statements by Russian and Chinese officials." Riga: NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, 2020, https://www.stratcomcoe.org/peoples-republic-china-and-russian-federation-strategic-allies
EventType
Modality
Location
Contact hours
1.
Lecture
On site
Auditorium
2

  1. Russia's Approach to the Belt and Road Initiative

Annotation: Western governments and analysts see the Belt and Road Initiative as ‘a worrying continuation of China's rising power’, and rightly so, as the initiative has not only an economic but also a political logic. China, no longer the ‘shy giant’, wants to build dependencies across Eurasia. The lecture introduces Russia’s controversial attitude towards the BRI. Russian officials never deny their support for the initiative and seem to be actively involved. However, Russia has its own Eurasian ambitions, which V. Putin does not hesitate to express at BRI events. We are talking about the Eurasian Economic Union, a club of countries with some common Soviet history, which was founded in 2014, two years after the BRI’s inception. Russia also tends to refer to India in the context of the EEU, showing that it has been able to secure India’s support, unlike the BRI. By mentioning an alternative vision of Eurasia, the Russian President is signalling to the domestic audience that the country is not dependent on China. Putin’s statements show Russia’s position – it is too big to submit to multilateralism led by China, so it will participate only on its own terms. Literature: Feng, Yujun, Gabuev, Alexander, Haenle, Paul, Ma, Bin, Trenin, Dmitri, "The Belt and Road Initiative: Views from Washington, Moscow, and Beijing," Carnegie Tsinghua, 2019, https://carnegietsinghua.org/2019/04/08/belt-and-road-initiative-views-from-washington-moscow-and-beijing-pub-78774 Makarov, Igor, Sokolova, Anna, "Coordination of the Eurasian Economic Union and the Silk Road Economic Belt: Opportunities for Russia," INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS RESEARCH JOURNAL. Vol. 11. No 2 (2016), https://iorj.hse.ru/data/2016/12/08/1111884690/I.%20Makarov,%20A.%20Sokolova.pdf, p.29.
EventType
Modality
Location
Contact hours
1.
Lecture
On site
Auditorium
2

  1. Are There Really ‘No Alliances’? The Reality of Security Cooperation

Annotation: Russia’s National Security Strategy highlights China as ‘a key factor in maintaining global and regional stability’. However, China does not respond with the same – Chinese officials constantly remind their Russian counterparts of their principles of security cooperation, or the three no’s: no alliances, no confrontation, and no targeting of a third country. In practice, however, the two countries have held joint military training on land and at sea, are discussing cooperation on deep space exploration, have prioritised joint cross-border counter-terrorism and counter-extremism measures, and Russia is helping China to develop a missile attack warning system (SPRN). V. Putin and his press secretary D. Peskov refer to China and Russia as allies. The two countries are working under a mutually signed Military Cooperation Plan 2017-2020. Their security and defence relationship has expanded to include all but one of the characteristics of an alliance – a mutual defence commitment. However, international analysts point to the conclusion that Moscow insists on a common security agenda because it needs to demonstrate a strong partnership externally, while Beijing is careful – China’s participation is not comparable to Russia’s and is rather symbolic. Chinese analysts consider Russia untrustworthy because it has also signed a Military Cooperation Plan with India. Voices in Russia also point to China’s joint counter-terrorism training with Central Asian countries. The objective of the lecture is to explore the field of China-Russia security cooperation, identify areas of interest and assess the degree of involvement of both actors. Literature: Gorenburg, Dmitry, "An Emerging Strategic Partnership: Trends in Russia-China Military Cooperation," George C. Marshall Center for European Security Studies, 2020, https://www.marshallcenter.org/en/publications/security-insights/emerging-strategic-partnership-trends-russia-china-military-cooperation-0 "Russia–China Military-Technical and Military Cooperation," In: Russian–Chinese Dialogue: The 2019 Model: Report No. 46/2019, (ed. I. Ivanov,) Russian International Affairs Council, https://russiancouncil.ru/papers/Russia-China-Report46-En.pdf, p. 39-43
EventType
Modality
Location
Contact hours
1.
Lecture
On site
Auditorium
2

  1. Thinking ‘Close to the Arctic’: China’s Ambitions, Russia’s Reactions

Annotation: China has declared itself a ‘near-Arctic state’, defined as ‘one of the continental states closest to the Arctic Circle’ and therefore entitled to express opinion on the strategic, economic, scientific, environmental, logistical and resource value of the Arctic. Russia’s Arctic territory of 3.7 million square kilometres can provide China with access to all these aspects, especially as the development of the transit potential of the Northern Sea Route is included in Russia’s foreign policy concept. The Arctic seems to be a topic of mutual understanding at summits attended by Chinese and Russian leaders, as joint statements always promise cooperation in research, transport, energy, tourism and the environment. Russia, however, is reluctant to engage fully: it does not want to re-evaluate Arctic access, is suspicious of Iceland’s promises to China, and believes that such changes ultimately benefit the US: “China is pushing the idea of ‘internationalisation of the Arctic’ through Iceland, and the US is to some extent supporting this idea.” Russian experts stress the vulnerability of the Arctic if Chinese investment does not contribute to the social development of the region. China, on the other hand, considers Russia’s policy too restrictive and non-inclusive towards foreign commercial shipping companies. The lecture examines the expectations of both sides and the results of the Russia-China Arctic dialogue, and analyses China’s approach to the other Arctic Council members – Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and the USA, bearing in mind also the cooperation with Russia of the interested newcomer who wants to get involved in the Arctic – India. Literature: Guangmiao Xu, " China's Arctic Interests and Policy: History, Legal Ground and Implementation," Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 2016, vol. 60, No 2, pp. 52-62, https://www.imemo.ru/en/jour/meimo/index.php?page_id=685&id=7212&jid=7204&jj=49 Trenin, Dmitri, "Russia and China in the Arctic: Cooperation, Competition, and Consequences," Carnegie Moscow Center, 2020, https://carnegie.ru/commentary/81407
EventType
Modality
Location
Contact hours
1.
Lecture
On site
Auditorium
2

  1. Tutorial on the Report

EventType
Modality
Location
Contact hours
1.
Class/Seminar
On site
Auditorium
2

  1. Cooperation Narratives. Literature Discussion. Presentations of Reports.

Annotation: Students and the lecturer will discuss the required readings, followed by the presentation of student reports (please see the list of topics below, under “Examinations” – Report Topics).
EventType
Modality
Location
Contact hours
1.
Class/Seminar
On site
Auditorium
2

  1. Russia’s Approach to the Belt and Road Initiative. Literature Discussion. Presentations of Reports.

Annotation: Students and the lecturer will discuss the required readings, followed by the presentation of student reports (please see the list of topics below, under “Examinations” – Report Topics).
EventType
Modality
Location
Contact hours
1.
Class/Seminar
On site
Auditorium
2

  1. China’s Interests in the Russian Arctic and Beyond: China in the Arctic Council and the Arctic Circle. Literature Discussion. Presentations of Reports.

Annotation: Students and the lecturer will discuss the required readings, followed by the presentation of student reports (please see the list of topics below, under “Examinations” – Report Topics).
EventType
Modality
Location
Contact hours
1.
Class/Seminar
On site
Auditorium
2

  1. Russia and China as Security Partners: Opportunities and Limitations. Literature Discussion. Presentations of Reports.

Annotation: Students and the lecturer will discuss the required readings, followed by the presentation of student reports (please see the list of topics below, under “Examinations” – Report Topics).
EventType
Modality
Location
Contact hours
1.
Class/Seminar
On site
Auditorium
2

  1. Tutorial on the Methodology of Written Works

EventType
Modality
Location
Contact hours
1.
Class/Seminar
On site
Other
2

  1. Exam

EventType
Modality
Location
Contact hours
1.
Class/Seminar
On site
Auditorium
2
Total ECTS (Creditpoints):
6.00
Contact hours:
34 Academic Hours
Final Examination:
Exam (Written)

Bibliography

Required Reading

1.

Visa literatūra ir angļu valodā un piemērota gan latviešu, gan angļu plūsmas studentiem

2.

"A new era for China-Russia relationship in 2019," ChinaDaily, source: Xinhua, December 28, 2019.

3.

Bērziņa-Čerenkova, U.A. "The People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation as Strategic Allies: Narrative analysis of public statements by Russian and Chinese officials." Riga: NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, 2020.

4.

"Beginning of Russian-Chinese talks in restricted format". President of Russia, June 5, 2019.

5.

Chatzky, Andrew, McBride, James. "China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative". Council on Foreign Relations.

6.

Feng, Yujun, Gabuev, Alexander, Haenle, Paul, Ma, Bin, Trenin, Dmitri. "The Belt and Road Initiative: Views from Washington, Moscow, and Beijing," Carnegie Tsinghua, 2019.

7.

Gorenburg, Dmitry. "An Emerging Strategic Partnership: Trends in Russia-China Military Cooperation," George C. Marshall Center for European Security Studies, 2020.

8.

Guangmiao Xu. "China's Arctic Interests and Policy: History, Legal Ground and Implementation," Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 2016, vol. 60, No 2, pp. 52-62.

9.

Guha, Seema. "Why Russia Remains India's Trusted Ally Despite Moscow's Bonhomie With China," Outlook India, July 13, 2020.

10.

Huong Le Thu, Sunny Cao. "Russia’s Growing Interests in the South China Sea," Real Clear Defense, December 18, 2019.

11.

Insinna, Valerie. "US looks to increase weapons exports to Vietnam, decrease Russian influence," Defence News, February 7, 2018.

12.

“Joint statement following the 20th India-Russia annual summit ”Reaching new heights of cooperation through trust and partnership“,” President of Russia, September 4, 2019.

13.

Kroenig, Matthew. "The United States Should Not Align With Russia Against China," Foreign Policy, May 13, 2020.

14.

Lynch, Ian. "What Are the Implications of China’s Growing Security Role in Central Asia?" The Diplomat, June 3, 2020.

15.

Makarov, Igor, Sokolova, Anna. "Coordination of the Eurasian Economic Union and the Silk Road Economic Belt: Opportunities for Russia," International Organisations Research Journal. Vol. 11. No 2 (2016).

16.

Masterson, Julia. "North Korea, China, Russia Converge Positions," Arms Control Association, January/February 2020.

17.

Phuc Thi Tran; Alena Vysotskaya G. Vieira; Laura C. Ferreira-Pereira. "Vietnam's strategic hedging vis-à-vis China: the roles of the European Union and Russia," Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, vol.56 no.1 Brasília 2013.

18.

Rozman, Glibert. "The China-Russia-North Korea triangle after Kim Jong-Un's turn to diplomacy," Korea Economic Institute of America, 2019.

19.

"Russia-China Military-Technical and Military Cooperation," In: Russian–Chinese Dialogue: The 2019 Model: Report No. 46/2019, (ed. I. Ivanov) Russian International Affairs Council, p. 39-43.

20.

"Russia Loosens Its Belt". Foreign Policy, July 16, 2020.

21.

Shah, Ankur. "Russia Loosens Its Belt," Foreign Policy, July 16, 2020.

22.

Trenin, Dmitri. "Russia and China in the Arctic: Cooperation, Competition, and Consequences," Carnegie Moscow Center, 2020.

23.

Umarov, Temur. "China Looms Large in Central Asia," Carnegie Moscow Center, March 30, 2020.

24.

"US lacks responsibility of a superpower in face of pandemic," Global Times, March 16, 2020.

25.

Zheng, Yu. "A Look at the China-US-Russia Triangle", China US Focus, March 4, 2020.

Additional Reading

1.

PIEZĪME: Kā papildus literatūra studentiem tiks piedāvātas nodaļas no kursa pasniedzējas topošās monogrāfijas/NOTE: As additional literature, students will be offered chapters from the future monograph of the course instructor "Xi’s China and Putin’s Russia: Negotiating a Multifaceted Relationship", World Scientific.

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